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6 Overview
7 The Industrial Revolution, beginning in Britain
8 and gathering momentum in the eighteenth
9 Century, enabled widespread ownership of
10 desirable, mass produced, identical goods. This
11 changed the characteristics of general theft
12 whereby it switched from being motivated
13 predominantly by a desire to take often unique
14 property for personal consumption to stealing to
15 sell standardized goods once more destined for
16 the personal enjoyment of others.
17 While weight and portability of items is
18 considered by thieves (Felson and Clarke 1998),
19 this most usually happens, at least where prolific
20 thieves are concerned, only if they believe
21 the goods will be saleable once removed
22 (Sutton 1995); at which time, considerations
23 regarding weight and portability, and even
24 danger of removal, will be balanced against
25 prices. Therefore, the issue of demand and supply
26 by theft is important because the most valid
27 predictor of items that most thieves will choose
28 to steal is whether or not they believe they can be
29 sold easily for a good price. For example, the
30 recent meteoric rise in scrap metal theft is fuelled
31 by a global metals shortage caused by the high
32demand for rawmaterials that are essential for the
33expanding industry, cities, and infrastructure of
34China. High prices motivate thieves to remove
35heavy lead flashings from the roofs of high
36buildings or risk electrocution stealing heavy
37and difficult to remove live copper cable. Glob-
38ally, scrap metal copper prices have doubled
39since 2004, followed worldwide by a significant
40number of electrocution fatalities at substations,
41railways, oil wells, overhead power lines,
42industrial buildings, and other places by thieves
43attempting to steal live copper cable.
44Understanding more about the various
45markets for stolen goods presents a challenge
46for criminology and the criminal justice system
47that is relatively overlooked by the conventional
48tight-focus upon only the thief and the act of
49theft. Yet, arguably, mankind cannot adequately
50understand the prevalence and incidence of theft
51of different goods without understanding how
52different types of stolen goods markets operate
53to influence demand and supply, who deals in
54them and why. Worldwide, societies that actively
55detect and punish thieves, seek to target harden
56property, or otherwise increase its capable guard-
57ianship all virtually ignore the large number of
58citizens who purchase stolen goods at bargain
59process, notwithstanding that all those who buy
60motivate thieves to supply by theft.
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61 Background to the Problem
62 Thieves are seldom found living in, or otherwise
63 owning, an Aladdin’s cave of stolen goods.
64 A safe assertion, therefore, is that most prolific
65 thieves seek to raise money by selling whatever
66 they steal. And the type of goods most frequently
67 stolen is determined by the level of demand for
68 them. Prolific thieves are generally very good at
69 gauging this because most sell stolen goods
70 within 30 min of their theft (Sutton 2010).
71 Most burglars and other thieves steal because
72 they want money, and Clarke (1999) explains that
73 offenders have a hierarchy of goods that they
74 prefer to take. Top of their list is cash, followed
75 by items that can be sold easily for relatively
76 high prices – such as jewelry and desirable
77 high-technology equipment. Stolen goods
78 markets and knowledge of what can be sold in
79 them motivate many thieves. This explains why
80 societies have experienced different crime waves
81 comprising targeted theft of very specific items
82 and commodities.
83 The prolific and successful thief must
84 complete one or else two objectives while
85 evading detection and apprehension. The first
86 objective is to steal cash or else saleable
87 commodities. If something other than cash is
88 stolen, the second objective is to either sell or
89 else trade the goods stolen. Where goods are
90 stolen, typically, police, prosecutors, and
91 criminologists view this behavior as comprising
92 the two distinct crimes and actions of stealing and
93 then of selling stolen goods. From the thieves’
94 perspective, however, these one or two objectives
95 need to be completed in order to achieve their
96 main aim, which is usually to acquire whatever it
97 is they initially needed or wanted to buy before
98 embarking on the crime.
99 Criminologists and crime scientists focusing
100 upon the act of theft typically seek to understand
101 the causes of, and find solutions to, the first
102 objective. But the wider aims and objectives of
103 theft from the perspective of the thief
104 include selling, fencing, and receiving stolen
105 goods (the second objective). In effect, the
106 offender is following a crime script that begins
107 before and continues after the act of theft. Seeing
108this wider picture can help to increase depth of
109understanding of acquisitive offending and
110possibly reveal innovative and promising
111avenues for seeking to tackle it.
112Dealers in stolen goods have most probably
113existed for as long there have been laws against
114theft and a demand for stolen goods. The fence is
115a middleman between the thief and the consumer
116of stolen goods.
117Through the act of buying stolen goods as
118a trusted criminal middleman, the fence
119allows the thief to avoid the risk of being
120caught in the act of trying to sell their loot directly
121to untrusted strangers. Hence, the origin of the
122word fence is widely believed to stem from
123the shortening of “defense” during the
124seventeenth century as a common
125understanding of the dealer in stolen goods
126being the thieves’ defense from detection.
127The role of historical and contemporary fences
128as protectors of the secret of thieves’ identities is
129perhaps most plainly highlighted by what is
130known about theft in the time of slavery. For
131example, Williams’ (1963) translation of a letter
132written by the Archdeacon of Hispaniola to the
133Council of the Indies in 1542 reveals that trusted
134fences served as a safe and ready market, thereby
135protecting numerous slaves from being linked
136directly to their crimes through selling goods
137they stole in slower and more risky ways.
138Money from the fence was then paid by the
139thief to his “master” in order to buy off his
140otherwise callously enforced labor. Likewise,
141slaves who were fences bought their own way
142out of the same exploitation through trading in
143stolen goods:
144The Negros are already doing business and trading
145among themselves to an extent involving great
146value and cunning, and as a result, big and notable
147robberies are committed on all the farms in the
148country. . . Some steal to pay for the day’s work
149which they have agreed to give their masters. . .
150Night and day they rob and steal anything in the
151country, including gold to be melted. These thefts
152are concealed with the assistance of two or three
153hundred Negros called “fences”, who go about the
154city seeking to make profits as I have said. . .and to
155pay the daily wage in exchange for each day or
156month or year, that they are at large and travel
157about the island. They take away stolen goods for
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158 sale and carry and conceal all that they are accus-
159 tomed to conceal. . .
160 As well as providing protection for thieves,
161 fences are conveniently sited to provide informa-
162 tion to assist their arrest and prosecution.
163 Although it has long been suspected that disin-
164 genuous police officers might allow fences to
165 continue trading in exchange for intelligence
166 about the thieves who supply them, there is no
167 published evidence that this actually happens.
168 Perhaps the only published evidence of such
169 things happening in the past can be found the
170 case of Jonathan Wild. In the eighteenth century,
171 Wild, the most notorious fence in history,
172 presented himself as a public hero, arresting so
173 many thieves that he earned the title Thief-Taker
174 General. Yet all the while, Wild secretly led
175 a gang of thieves, regularly received stolen
176 goods, manipulated victims to offer a reward for
177 their return, and then pretended to track down the
178 goods he already illegally possessed to claim
179 the reward. Unsurprisingly, the question of the
180 degree of guilty mind of the receiver
181 has, for centuries, occupied legal scholars
182 (e.g., Colquhoun 1796; Hall 1952), but astonish-
183 ingly few contemporary criminologists are
184 concerned with criminal career ethnographies
185 of successful fences (Steffensmeier 1986) or
186 understanding the wider dynamics of the trade
187 (Sutton 1998).
188 Stolen Goods Market Types: Guilty
189 Minds and Offending Dynamics
190 The London magistrate Patrick Colquhoun
191 (1796) was concerned with the guilty knowledge
192 of people buying stolen goods at bargain prices.
193 His threefold typology consists of:
194 1. Criminal receivers (professional fences who
195 deliberately encourage theft)
196 2. Careless receivers (have a reckless disregard
197 for the origin of the goods)
198 3. Innocent purchasers (believe good were
199 legitimately purchased by the seller)
200 A new typology was created 156 years later by
201 the jurisprudentialist Jerome Hall (1952), who set
202out to emphasize the role of the professional
203fence in marketing stolen goods with another
204threefold typology:
2051. The professional receiver (fence who deals in
206stolen goods)
2072. The occasional receiver (buys for resale but
208does so only infrequency)
2093. The lay receiver (buyer and consumer of
210stolen goods)
211Even professional fences operate at different
212levels, as can be seen in the following three-tier
213fencing level typology first outlined by Lewis
214(2006):
215• Level-1 fence: The thief sells to a level-1 fence
216(often a storeowner such as a pawnbroker or
217jeweler), who then sells the goods in his store
218or else sells them to another fence.
219• Level-2 (wholesale) fence: This fence buys
220from a level-1 fence and then often cleans up
221and/or repackages the goods to make it look
222as though they came legitimately from
223the manufacturer. These are very clandestine
224operations that are perhaps most likely to be
225found by police officers working back from an
226investigation of a level-3 fence operation.
227Those who operate stolen car rings also fall
228within this subtype.
229• Level-3 fence: A level-3 fence takes
230repackaged goods from a level-2 wholesale
231fence and diverts them to retailers. At times,
232major retailers find themselves innocently
233purchasing the very goods that were stolen
234from them. Level-3 fences have been known
235to sell perfume, cosmetics, razor blades, and
236shoplifted designer goods in this way.
237Being human constructs, all typologies tell
238us as much about those who create them as they
239do about their subject matter. Hall’s typology, for
240example, was purposely designed to emphasize
241the role of the professional fence in the marketing
242of stolen goods, because he sought to bring
243about a change in US law that would see
244professional fences treated with greater severity.
245Lewis’s three-tier fence model is concerned
246only with describing the hierarchy and marketing
247dynamics of fences dealing in goods stolen in
248organized retail theft.
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249 Seeking to classify the various ways that the
250 most commonly stolen goods are sold, Sutton’s
251 original (1998) fivefold typology of handling
252 dynamics, updated to six to incorporate later
253 knowledge of eSelling (Sutton 2010), describes
254 how thieves sell, dealers deal, and the public buys
255 stolen goods. No one of Sutton’s six market types
256 is known to bemore serious or important than any
257 other in terms of the role it plays in promoting
258 theft by motivating thieves, fences, and the
259 buying public. Moreover, research suggests that
260 thieves and dealers regularly use more than one
261 type (Sutton 1998):
262 1. Commercial Fence Supplies. Stolen goods
263 are sold by thieves to commercial fences
264 operating out of shops such as jewelers,
265 pawnbrokers, and secondhand dealers.
266 2. Commercial Sales. Commercial fences
267 usually pose as legitimate business owners
268 while secretly selling stolen goods for
269 a profit, either directly to the (innocent)
270 consumer or more rarely to another distributor
271 who thinks the goods can be sold again for
272 additional profit.
273 3. Commercially Facilitated Sales (modified
274 here from eSelling). This market type involves
275 either the thief or a residential or commercial
276 fence knowingly selling stolen goods
277 through classified advertisements in
278 traditional newspapers and magazines,
279 through traditional auctions, or online through
280 classified sales websites such as Craig’s List or
281 Preloved.co.uk. They may also sell stolen
282 goods on Internet auction sites such as eBay.
283 4. Residential Fence Supplies. Stolen goods
284 (particularly electrical goods) are sold by
285 thieves to fences, usually at the fence’s
286 home. The fence may be drug dealer and
287 may be a prolific dealer in stolen goods or
288 may deal only occasionally.
289 5. Network Sales. Stolen goods are passed on,
290 and each participant adds a little to the price
291 until a consumer is found. This may involve
292 a residential fence or commercial fence selling
293 to other fences. Alternatively, the buyer may
294 be the final consumer or may sell the goods on
295 again through friendship networks.
2966. Hawking. Thieves, or their friends, sell stolen
297goods directly to consumers on the street or in
298places such as bars and pubs or door to door in
299residential areas (e.g., shoplifters selling
300cigarettes, toiletries, clothes, or food).
301Thieves tend to be flexible and may trade in
302several different markets depending upon where
303they are, the time of day, what they have for sale,
304and how quickly they need to sell it.
305Thieves do not simply respond to requests to
306steal certain types of goods to order, because
307many steal to offer goods to total strangers,
308which can lead to the thief directly motivating
309members of the public to become regular
310customers in Hawking markets and tempting
311previously straight business owners to become
312fences by way of commercial fence supplies
313(Sutton 1998). Experienced commercial fences,
314in turn, use their respectable business fronts to
315recruit inexperienced thieves who come in to
316offer them stolen goods. Commercial
317fences sometimes mix stolen goods in with their
318legitimate stock. Somewhat perversely this helps
319to sell legitimate stock, because some people
320think they are getting a real bargain if the shop
321has something of a reputation for selling
322high-quality goods suspiciously cheaply as
323opposed to cheaply made legitimate
324merchandise.
325Research suggests that stealing to order is not
326as common as stealing to offer (Sutton 2010).
327And thieves’ knowledge of the “standing
328demand” for particular types of stolen goods
329influences the types of goods that are stolen,
330which can lead to crime waves when thieves
331target particularly hot products. Past crime
332waves of this kind have included theft of lead,
333copper, aluminum, bronze, silver, gold, color
334television sets, hi-fi equipment, video-cassette
335recorders (VCRs), motor vehicle radio-cassette
336players, computer memory chips, mountain
337bikes, laptop computers, digital versatile disks
338(DVDs), games consoles, mobile phones, and
339in-car satellite navigation devices.
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340 The Basic Principles of Fencing
341 According to the US Senate’s comprehensive
342 review of fencing operations, the overwhelming
343 majority of fences in the North America operate
344 legitimate businesses (Sutton 2010). To operate
345 successfully and avoid detection, the criminal
346 dealings of the fence must be much less
347 visible than the offenses and offenders that
348 initially supply stolen goods. To achieve this,
349 the fence must coach thieves to avoid detection,
350 conceal his own trading behind a legitimate front,
351 remain willfully ignorant of the provenance of
352 goods bought from other fences, avoid storing
353 goods to avoid detection but know how to safely
354 store them if necessary, be wary of working with
355 police informants, and limit the number of people
356 who know what he is up to. He must never admit
357 to knowingly trading in stolen goods if
358 questioned by detectives, and he must have
359 money for a good lawyer in case of arrest
360 (Steffensmeier and Ulmer 2005).
361 Thieves and dealers in the UK and USA at
362 least operate a “two- and three-way split”
363 whereby experienced thieves selling to fences
364 ask for between half the wholesale price and
365 a third of the fences’ selling price. This tends to
366 vary though depending upon whether or not items
367 are in high demand as fast-moving consumer
368 goods or high end luxuries. Thieves selling stolen
369 cigarettes, for example, are generally paid
370 between 30 % and 40 % of the retail price.
371 Shoplifters selling stolen clothes, meat, and
372 bottles of alcohol such as vodka, whisky, and
373 brandy directly to consumers tend to receive
374 half the retail price. Other stolen but used items,
375 like electrical goods stolen from house burglar-
376 ies, are usually sold by the thief for a third of the
377 retail value. If a fence sells directly to someone
378 who knows the goods are stolen, then they sell
379 for half the retail price. If the fence is
380 a businessperson selling stolen goods to innocent
381 customers through a shop, then the goods are
382 usually sold for two-thirds of the retail value.
383 Gold jewelry is different, however, in that it is
384 sold by thieves to jewelry shops for the going rate
385 for scrap gold. Presumably that same rule applies
386 for scrap metals of all kinds. Where other stolen
387goods are concerned, this two- and three-way
388split on prices appears to be cast in stone, not
389least because several writers have documented
390these pricing practices existing for well over
391100 years (Quennell 1958; Steffensmeier 1986,
392Sutton 1998). Perhaps this is because it is simple
393to understand and operate by those motivated to
394make quick but regular profits in illicit markets.
395The Seller’s Dilemma
396Devising and testing creative ways to increase the
397difficulties and dilemmas faced by those dealing
398in stolen goods might be a useful approach in
399designing theft prevention and control strategies.
400The stolen goods seller’s dilemma, whether she is
401the thief or a dealer (the fence), is that to increase
402her profit, she has to increase her risks of getting
403caught. The seller can choose to sell only to
404people that she knows, which reduces her risks
405of being ripped off or detected but restricts her
406sales and buying opportunities. The thief can sell
407to strangers, which allows her access to more
408potential customers, but also increases her
409chances of being arrested or robbed. This
410dilemma applies to both the thief and the dealer,
411but the business-owning commercial fence must
412also simultaneously nurture the confidence of
413thieves with whom they deal while projecting
414a legitimate trading image.
415These conflicting demands of access and secu-
416rity determine to a large extent the structure of
417local stolen goods markets. The small size of
418most fencing operations, uniformity in pricing,
419and limited profit making from theft should come
420as no surprise since competitive options are lim-
421ited by virtue of there being only so many ways of
422doing things efficiently and effectively in any
423kind of illicit market. This is because advertising,
424marketing, warehousing, transportation, and
425expansion options are necessarily avoided, or
426else extremely limited, in order to avoid detection
427and regulation (see Reuter 1985).
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428 Prevalence
429 Few estimates of the amount of trading in stolen
430 goods markets exist, but an exercise conducted
431 by the British Government to inform the UK
432 National Accounts (1997) claimed that in 1995,
433 thieves selling stolen goods within Britain
434 cleared between £900 million and £1,680 million
435 (net) and that fences cleared between £450
436 million and £875 million (net) through selling
437 stolen property.
438 The 1994 British Crime Survey (Sutton 1998)
439 found that over the previous 5-year period, 11 %
440 of the population of England and Wales admitted
441 buying stolen goods, which they knew or
442 believed to be stolen; 70 % thought that at least
443 some of their neighbors had stolen goods in their
444 homes; and 21 % thought a lot of them had the
445 same. Looking back at just the previous year,
446 rather than the last five, the British Offending,
447 Crime and Justice Survey (Sutton et al. 2008)
448 found that 7 % of adults in England and
449 Wales admitted buying stolen goods while
450 2.7% admitted selling them. Furthermore, almost
451 half of males aged 16–24 had been offered or else
452 bought stolen goods. Comparing males with
453 females, this research suggests that it is possible
454 that more than twice as many males buy. In the
455 poorest neighborhoods, 40 % of males bought
456 stolen goods compared to 17 % of females.
457 Even in the most affluent neighborhoods, 7 % of
458 people bought stolen goods. Incredible as they
459 are, these figures could be an underestimate if
460 some respondents were reluctant to admit buying
461 stolen goods and others forgot that they did so.
462 The importance of the stolen goods market
463 problem is further highlighted by Graham and
464 Bowling (1995) who found that handling stolen
465 goods was the most prevalent crime admitted
466 by their respondents, with 49 % of offenders
467 admitting to having done it in the past year.
468 Responses to Stolen Goods Markets
469 A consistent theme in the social sciences and
470 the multidisciplinary areas of criminology
471 and criminal justice is the unintended, sometimes
472ironic, consequences of purposive action. This
473theme, which is central to Merton’s (1949)
474self-fulfilling prophecy, is reflected in the ratio-
475nale behind the market reduction approach to
476theft (Sutton 1998). Specifically, those who buy
477stolen goods unintentionally support a market
478supplied by theft for their own future
479victimization.
480Since the existence of “safe” and ready
481stolen goods markets is a difficult to disentangle,
482downstream consequence of theft, as well as one
483causal factor behind the motivation for theft,
484knowing more about stolen goods markets, in
485order to seek to reduce them and make it
486more risky to deal in them with situational
487crime reduction approaches, might provide
488one potentially promising avenue. The market
489reduction approach (MRA) (Sutton 1998; Sutton
490et al. 2001) is designed to do this. Although it is
491recommended as promising practice on official
492websites supported by government agencies in
493the UK, USA, Australia, and New Zealand, the
494MRA remains as yet unproven (Hale et al. 2004)
495avenue for reducing acquisitive crimes.
496A comprehensive review of promising
497policing and multi-agency partnership responses
498to stolen goods markets, including those known
499to have limited effectiveness, was commissioned
500by the US Department of Justice (Sutton 2010).
501The review examines various crackdowns on
502stolen goods markets that have been tried out in
503the UK and USA with various degrees of success.
504One important conclusion reached is that even
505the most apparently successful schemes prove
506difficult to maintain over time with the traditional
507focus on the theft act taking priority in the
508allocation of scarce resources (Walsh 1976).
509Moreover, limited research in this area reveals
510that what works and does not work in tackling
511stolen goods markets is complex and at times
512counterintuitive. Research findings – however
513limited – are particularly valuable, therefore, in
514helping police services avoid repeating past
515mistakes. Clandestine police storefront
516antifencing sting operations, for example, can
517have the unintended effect of generating
518theft in the surrounding area to meet the
519demand they have unintentionally created
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520 (Langworthy and Lebeau 1992). Furthermore,
521 despite being a favorite crime reduction activity
522 in many police services, property marking has
523 never been proven to reduce theft largely because
524 thieves steal both “invisibly” and clearly marked
525 property and fences and citizens will buy it
526 (Sutton 2010). Therefore, the oftentimes bold
527 assertions made by commercial companies for
528 the success of their expensive property-marking
529 products have never been confirmed by indepen-
530 dent academic research (Knutsson 1984; Sutton
531 1998; Harris et al. 2003; Hale et al. 2004).
532 Explaining the Relative Importance of
533 Stolen Goods Markets: Why the Market,
534 Not Opportunity, Makes the Thief
535 Property thieves, particularly prolific ones, are
536 generally perceived to be “bent” offenders
537 whose predation upon “straight society” can be
538 explained by their relative poverty, subculture,
539 wider cultural influences, poor socialization,
540 substance addiction, or individual pathology
541 acting alone as significant causes or else together
542 as a combination of forces that interacts with
543 so-called opportunities for theft. Here, current
544 criminological understanding of the crime act
545 has been shaped by the current criminological
546 notion of “opportunity” that is classically defined
547 in Crime Opportunity Theory as what happens
548 when a relatively more capable and sufficiently
549 motivated “likely” offender succeeds against
550 a target or victim – thereby proving that
551 they were capable offenders against relatively
552 incapable or absent guardianship. However, this
553 crime as “opportunity” explanation does not at
554 the time of writing provide discoverable and
555 measurable quantifiable values that would enable
556 criminologists to predict and test individual or
557 general victim or target vulnerability relative to
558 actual or potential capable offender motivation or
559 guardianship abilities (Clarke 1984). This
560 same limitation applies in the area of repeat
561 victimization and within various types of high
562 crime environment or in crime hot spots. It is
563 a truism therefore that capable and suitably
564 motivated offender components of current
565notions of “crime opportunity” cannot be
566discovered and objectively measured in
567nature or society before a successful crime
568happens – only afterward. This limitation means
569that “crime opportunity,” as the “almost always,
570elements of a criminal act” described in the
571Routine Activity Theory (RAT) crime triangle
572by Felson and Boba (2010, pp. 28–40), and in
573the description of crime as opportunity that is
574classically outlined by Mayhew et al. (1976), is
575the essential data of a successfully completed
576crime in commission. In other words, it is always
577knowable – but only ever after the event – that the
578crime happened because the offender could
579successfully commit it or else failed because he
580could not.
581Logically, therefore, “crime opportunity”
582cannot be a cause of crime because Crime
583Opportunity Theory merely describes whether
584or not offenders were in fact more capable
585than the crime target’s guardianship. It follows,
586therefore, that until a crime is successfully
587completed or fails in the attempt, the current
588notion of “crime opportunity” cannot be known
589by offenders to exist in advance of the crime
590being completed or failing. This is because no
591potential thief could know for sure that they
592would be more capable than any guardian or
593that guardianship would remain absent. After
594all, if that was possible, there would be no reason
595for so many failed criminal attempts.
596The RAT “crime opportunity” incorporates
597the commonsense premise that before stealing,
598most offenders rationally weigh up what they
599perceive to be risks versus rewards. However,
600this explanation of perceptions in the so-called
601crime opportunity event does not include human
602guardian perceptions of their own relative
603capabilities. Offender and guardian perceptions
604aside, if the current notion of crime opportunity,
605which combines RAT with the known successful
606criminal outcome described in the classic crime
607triangle, could somehow exist in advance of the
608crime actually being accomplished, then it would
609logically follow that every successfully
610completed crime and every offense of attempt
611would be the cause of itself, which is clearly
612impossible according to the scientific laws that
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613 govern the universe above the subatomic
614 level. Therefore, the widely cited claim that
615 “opportunity makes the thief” (Felson and Clarke
616 1998) is undoubtedly logically flawed (see also
617 Sutton 2012).
618 Consequently, this notion of opportunity is
619 neither a rational framework nor model for theory
620 building. Nor is it a stand-alone theory of crime
621 causation (e.g., see Felson and Clarke 1998, p. 9;
622 Tilley and Laycock 2002; Felson and Boba 2010,
623 p. 47) nor any kind of measure of differential
624 vulnerability (see Clarke 1984), because it does
625 not quantify levels of vulnerability. What is
626 more, this notion of “crime opportunity” does
627 not even fit common understandings of opportu-
628 nity because it does not describe any kind of
629 realistic pre-crime situation formed by
630 a juncture of circumstances favorable to crime.
631 Logically, therefore, there is no opportunity in
632 Crime Opportunity Theory.
633 The current classic RAT and situational
634 crime prevention notion of “crime opportunity”
635 (perhaps ratortunity is a better word for it) is an
636 elegantly precise, perhaps perfect, post hoc
637 description of any successfully completed
638 criminal act, which makes it a veracious, and
639 therefore important, description of what has
640 happened. But descriptions, no matter how
641 elegantly described, cannot explain the reasons
642 for the data. It follows, therefore, that precise
643 descriptions of the components present at every
644 crime act cannot explain the cause of the crime.
645 This is true for all descriptions and the data
646 they describe (Shermer 1991). Just as a fossil
647 embedded in the geological fossil record, no
648 matter how precisely and elegantly
649 described, cannot explain itself without
650 a separate theory – such as Darwin’s theory of
651 evolution.
652 Criminology requires a crime theory to
653 explain why, in all successfully completed
654 crimes, offenders are sufficiently motivated to
655 prevail against protective measures. Simply
656 saying, for example, that successful offenders
657 were sufficiently motivated to overcome levels
658 of guardianship, perhaps even ones that had
659 deterred them in the past, because they
660 rationally reevaluated the risks and rewards
661(Felson and Clarke 1998) does not explain at
662what point and why the rewards and risks
663switched to make a once adequately protected
664target become sufficiently vulnerable. In order
665to do that, criminologists need to look for more
666promising explanations that are separate from the
667data and descriptions of criminal acts they seek to
668explain. One potentially promising avenue here is
669to focus upon precisely how variations in demand
670for particular stolen goods differentially
671influence the motivation of thieves and their
672perceptions of risks versus rewards. This is why
673the strangely neglected area of stolen goods
674markets deserves more attention.
675In the case of theft, changes in technologies,
676cultures, consumption patterns, and the economy
677of a nation state can sometimes act as a spur for
678new crime motivating markets, leading to
679increased levels of theft of particular types of
680property and changes in ways and methods of
681offending (e.g., Mann and Sutton 1998). Future
682research in this area will most certainly build
683upon existing knowledge and seek to understand
684more about the role that stolen goods markets
685play in motivating people to begin and continue
686stealing. One thing waiting to be discovered is
687information about exactly how and why an
688increase in demand for particular things can
689change them from “warm” to “hot products”
690(Clarke 1999) and hence increase both licit and
691illicit prices (Sutton 1995). If future research
692could find and then attach a quantifiable value to
693the “sufficient motivation switching point” for
694offending (if indeed there is such a thing) as
695a sufficient condition for theft, then criminolo-
696gists would be in a better position to predict
697acquisitive crime waves. Perhaps one day crimi-
698nologists will be able to accurately predict the
699likelihood of the next otherwise unexpected
700crime wave before it becomes a crime harvest.
701Forewarned with such knowledge, it would be
702possible to take preventative action, rather than
703merely explaining why the crime wave happened
704and seeking to prevent individual repeat occur-
705rences. Understanding more about the role of
706stolen goods markets in theft, therefore, offers
707further promising incremental advances and
708perhaps, potentially, a monumental breakthrough
F 8 Fencing/Receiving Stolen Goods
Comp. by: KArunKumar Stage: Proof Chapter No.: 10 Title Name: ECCJ
Date:3/7/13 Time:00:21:06 Page Number: 9
709 in criminological knowledge, crime reduction
710 policy making, and policing.
711 Conclusions and the Way Forward
712 Little is known about the factors that influence
713 demand for stolen goods, what impact ready
714 markets have on potential and persistent property
715 thieves, and what might be the most promising
716 ways to tackle effectively the crime of knowingly
717 buying stolen goods. One thing is certain though:
718 if more goods are stolen from people on the street
719 or from their houses and cars, then they are
720 normally purchased by other people to enjoy on
721 the street or in their own houses and cars.
722 Surprisingly little research has been
723 conducted into who buys stolen goods and why.
724 Accordingly, compared with other areas of
725 criminology, such as ethnographic and
726 subcultural analysis of various different types of
727 theft and thieves, the subject of stolen goods
728 markets is a weirdly neglected area. Despite the
729 fact that fences and consumers create much of the
730 demand for stolen goods that is met through
731 supply by theft, policing and crime reduction
732 initiatives remain for the most part heavily
733 focused upon thieves alone. Given the pervasive
734 nature of stolen goods markets and the fact that
735 the stolen goods trade is, when compared
736 with acts of theft, afforded far less resources and
737 attention, a most telling question is whether it is
738 evenhanded or particularly efficient criminal
739 justice policy or policing practice to focus so
740 much attention on property thieves, rather than
741 those who buy from them.
742 Knowing what research reveals about adults
743 whomotivate young thieves to steal by fencing or
744 otherwise criminally receiving stolen goods and
745 considering the number of thieves occupying
746 prison systems throughout the world reveals
747 a telling question, namely, why do so few
748 receivers of stolen goods share prison time with
749 their regularly incarcerated suppliers?
750 The answer lies partly in the fact that gathering
751 sufficient evidence to prosecute fences is difficult
752 because they conceal stolen goods trading behind
753 legitimate business fronts. Professional fences
754are expert at this and can remain undetected for
755years. In addition, members of the general public
756who buy directly from thieves for their own
757consumption do not do so as prolifically as indi-
758vidual thieves tend to steal. Consequently, their
759risk of detection is lower. Furthermore, public
760tolerance toward those who deal out of their
761cars and houses, often using networks of contacts
762in the community, is high because these dealers
763are seen by their customers as providing a kind of
764community service by way of essential or
765expensive luxury items at bargain prices.
766If fences and the general public who buy
767stolen goods are responsible for creating markets
768for everyone’s potential victimization, then
769finding effective ways to reduce such markets
770appears to be a logical and compelling way to
771reduce theft. Detecting those engaged in handling
772stolen goods and applying legal sanctions against
773them ensures that thieves and handlers have less
774chance of profiting from the misery of victims of
775burglary and other thefts, which is arguably an
776important criminal justice end in its own right and
777perhaps one that criminologists should not lose
778sight of in pursuit of measurable theft reduction.
779That said, it is not possible to predict accurately
780how different populations might respond in
781the event they were significantly deprived of
782stolen bargains.
783Since theft remains a problem to be solved,
784criminologists will continue to make progress
785in the area. The logical impossibility of
786“crime opportunity” being a cause of crime
787brings us to a nexus where the next fundamental
788breakthrough in understanding the causes of theft
789may possibly be a new hypothesis proposing an
790explanation for how “demand” for hot
791products interacts with human actors to cause
792a “switching point” in offender motivation with
793the effect that what was previously capable
794guardianship of valuable products becomes
795inadequate when their trading value increases to
796a certain level, which is exactly what happened
797when electricity first ceased to be a capable
798guardian of live copper cable when global copper
799prices rose significantly in 2004 and thereafter.
800If such a hypothesis is formulated, criminologists
801and economists will do their best to disprove it
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802 through a process of prediction and observable
803 outcome. If disconfirming evidence is not forth-
804 coming, then the issue of fencing and receiving
805 stolen goods may no longer remain so strangely
806 ignored because it might enable criminologists to
807 better forecast crime waves. The theft reduction
808 potential of adopting such a market reduction
809 approach is huge.
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